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I. INTRODUCTION 
I welcome you to this Symposium on The History and Future of Election 
Law here at the Moritz College of Law. Now before we get underway, I want 
to express a few words of gratitude. First, to the Ohio State Law Journal, for 
being the primary sponsor of this Symposium, and particularly to Amanda 
Grandjean, the Symposium Editor, and Andrew Mikac, the Editor in Chief. 
Anyone who knows Amanda knows her boundless energy and enthusiasm, and 
she has put her entire heart and soul into preparing for today.  
I also want to thank Steve Huefner, who is taking the lead with our new 
interdisciplinary Democracy Studies initiative, which has provided 
considerable support for this Symposium. Steve has been involved with 
Amanda and Andrew in planning for today every step of the way. And also 
Daphne Meimaridis, Program Administrator of Election Law @ Moritz, who 
has been assisting Steve with the administration of the new Democracy 
Studies initiative and has been applying her usual superb professionalism to 
this exciting new endeavor. Matt Borden, our Democracy Studies Fellow, has 
also been of great help to Steve. So we must thank all of these folks. 
                                                                                                                     
 
 
Charles W. Ebersold and Florence Whitcomb Ebersold Chair in Constitutional Law 
at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and Director of Election Law @ 
Moritz. 
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II. “FAULTY” CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE 
Let me open our conversation today with an anecdote about James 
Madison. In 1823, he acknowledged to a correspondent that the Constitutional 
Convention of 1787 had been too hasty in its treatment of the method for 
electing the President, and as a result, had adopted a “faulty” procedure.1 
“Faulty” was Madison’s own word.2 This issue of how to elect the President, 
Madison wrote, “took place in the latter stage of the Session” and “was not 
exempt from a degree of the hurrying influence produced by fatigue and 
impatience in all such Bodies.”3 That’s a clear confession of error.  
In the same letter, Madison sketched his own proposed constitutional 
amendment to fix the defects he saw.4 What is important now is not the details 
of Madison’s proposal, but that he thought a constitutional amendment was 
necessary even after the Twelfth Amendment had been adopted two decades 
earlier, supposedly to solve the problem caused by the sloppiness of the 
Framers back in Philadelphia.5 But in 1823, Madison did not think that the 
Twelfth Amendment was enough.6 Anticipating exactly what would occur the 
following year, in the election of 1824, Madison did not think the Constitution 
had an adequate mechanism for dealing with the situation in which the nation 
was having difficulty choosing among more than two candidates.7 If you recall 
from your high school history class, 1824 involved a four-way split between 
Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay, and a guy we have all 
forgotten about, William Crawford from Georgia, who was Secretary of the 
Treasury.8 Because none of the four received a majority of electoral votes, the 
election was thrown to the House of Representatives,9 but the Twelfth 
Amendment specified a one-state, one-vote procedure in the House, requiring 
that each state’s delegation share a single vote.10 It was this one-state, one-vote 
aspect of the Twelfth Amendment, which also had been part of the original 
Constitution,11 which Madison especially objected to.12 This provision, 
                                                                                                                     
 1 Letter from James Madison to George Hay (Aug. 23, 1823), reprinted in 3 THE 
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 556–57 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 2 Id. at 557.  
 3 Id. at 556.  
 4 Id. at 557. 
 5 See id. at 556–57; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 12. 
 6 See generally Letter from James Madison to George Hay, supra note 1.  
 7 See generally id.  
 8 Tally of the 1824 Electoral College Vote, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/electoral-tally [https://perma.cc/NH9X-QTD2] 
(last updated Oct. 3, 2016).  
 9 See generally DONALD RATCLIFFE, THE ONE-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL CONTEST: 
ADAMS, JACKSON, AND 1824’S FIVE-HORSE RACE (2015).  
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. 12. 
 11 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 12 Why James Madison Wanted to Change the Way We Vote for President, FAIRVOTE 
(June 18, 2012), http://www.fairvote.org/why-james-madison-wanted-to-change-the-way-
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Madison wrote, “is so great a departure from the Republican principle of 
numerical equality . . . and is so pregnant also with a mischievous tendency in 
practice, that an amendment of the Constitution on this point is justly called 
for by all its considerate [and] best friends.”13 The nation should have heeded 
Madison’s warning then, and we should still heed it now. 
Sure, we have not had an election thrown to the House since 1824,14 but 
this faulty provision still lurks in the background, potentially to be invoked if 
for some reason no candidate gets an Electoral College majority. More 
important, it is symbolic of the larger problem that concerned Madison—that 
greatly affected subsequent history and that remains with us today—the 
problem that the nation still lacks an adequate method to settle on a final 
choice when more than two candidates command significant interest among 
voters.  
The most vivid example of this deficiency is the election of 1912, when 
Teddy Roosevelt’s split from the Republicans caused a three-way race that 
enabled Woodrow Wilson to win,15 when there is little doubt that if there had 
been a runoff between Roosevelt and Wilson, Roosevelt would have prevailed 
with the votes from William Howard Taft’s supporters.16 Taft, as all Ohioans 
know, was the incumbent President, who had disappointed Roosevelt after 
Roosevelt had already picked Taft to be his successor.17 Taft finished third, 
behind Wilson and Roosevelt;18 but if Taft had no longer been in the running, 
Roosevelt undoubtedly would have finished first.19 Who knows what would 
have happened if Roosevelt, rather than Wilson, had occupied the White 
House when World War I broke out in Europe in 1914? Some historians are 
willing to speculate that Roosevelt would have gotten the United States 
involved much sooner than Wilson did,20 would not have been the naïve 
supporter of the failed League of Nations that Wilson was,21 and perhaps 
would have laid the foundations for a different sort of post-war settlement in 
                                                                                                                     
we-vote-for-president [https://perma.cc/VQS3-E7Z5] (advocating for electing the President 
through a national popular vote). 
 13 Letter from James Madison to George Hay, supra note 1, at 557.  
 14 See generally RATCLIFFE, supra note 9.  
 15 See Kent Garber, Three-Way Race of 1912 Had It All, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Jan. 28–Feb. 4, 2008, at 43, 43–44.  
 16 Edward B. Foley, Third Party and Independent Presidential Candidates: The Need 
for a Runoff Mechanism, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 11), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795124 [https://perma.cc/CG65-HHQZ]. 
 17 Garber, supra note 15, at 43. 
 18 Id. at 44. 
 19 Foley, supra note 16 (manuscript at 11–12). 
 20 Jeff Nilsson, Teddy Roosevelt and World War I: An Alternative History, SATURDAY 
EVENING POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/2014/04/17/uncateg 
orized/roosevelt-1912.html [https://perma.cc/3VHD-M2QY]. 
 21 See CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 221 
(2003).  
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Europe that might have avoided the rise of Nazism.22 Who knows? The point 
suffices that America’s method of electing its President had potentially 
profound consequences for the course of the world as well as American 
history.  
We can make this same point about the 2000 election. Even setting aside 
the problem of hanging chads,23 there is the matter of Ralph Nader. If America 
had a runoff system for its presidential election, such that voters nationwide 
were given the head-to-head choice between Bush and Gore, there is little 
doubt that Gore would have prevailed. In fact, Gore finished ahead of Bush in 
the national popular vote; Nader’s role in affecting the outcome of the election 
was in Florida, where Gore almost certainly would have beaten Bush if just the 
two of them had been on the ballot in the state.24 We can never know what 
would have transpired if Gore rather than Bush had occupied the Oval Office 
from 2001 to 2005, but we can be confident that history would have unfolded 
at least somewhat differently. Thus, as at the outset of the twentieth-century, 
so too at the start of the twenty-first, America’s method of presidential 
elections has potentially momentous consequences for the entire flow of world 
events.  
III. FRANCE’S ELECTORAL SYSTEM  
France is among many nations that use a runoff for its presidential 
election, or what they call its two-round system.25 The winner of the runoff is 
not always the leader after the first round. In 1974, 1981, and 1995, the second 
place finisher after the first round was the one to win the runoff. In ’74, for 
example, Francois Mitterand led after the first round, but Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing prevailed in the runoff.26 In ’81, it was the exact opposite 
situation.27 In ’95, Lionel Jospin led after the first round, but Jacques Chirac 
won in the May runoff election.28 But in these three cases, the system 
guaranteed—as it was designed to do—that the winner of the presidency 
commanded support from the majority of the electorate.  
America should at least consider whether France has a better system of 
electing its President than we do. I make this point not to settle the question, 
but rather to open discussion. The question, as I see it, is the extent to which 
America has an electoral system well-tailored to providing electoral outcomes 
                                                                                                                     
 22 John Milton Cooper, Jr., Whose League of Nations? Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow 
Wilson, and World Order, in ARTISTS OF POWER 163, 178 (Wiliam N. Tilchin & Charles E. 
Neu eds., 2006).  
 23 See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 24 Foley, supra note 16 (manuscript at 13–14). 
 25 Two-Round System, ELECTORAL REFORM SOC’Y, http://www.electoral-
reform.org.uk/two-round-system [https://perma.cc/PAZ5-B87T]. 
 26 POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 2014, at 483 (Tom Lansford ed., 2014).  
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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that match the electoral preferences of the eligible voters. To invoke Nick 
Stephanopolous’s work, of which I am very much a fan, the question is the 
extent to which America’s electoral system produces an alignment, rather than 
a misalignment, between what voters want and what voters get.29  
IV. CONCLUSION 
We can ask that question across multiple domains of America’s electoral 
system, with respect to congressional elections, state and local elections, and 
so forth. We can also ask whether particular features of America’s electoral 
system contribute to alignment or misalignment: features like campaign 
finance rules, redistricting rules, and voter registration rules—the things we 
are going to be talking about today. We can inquire whether the degree of 
alignment or misalignment has increased or decreased over time. I am sure 
that we will explore these many matters as part of today’s Symposium. Indeed, 
this Symposium is not about presidential elections specifically, but about 
election law much more broadly, and it’s not just about the changes we might 
like to see to election procedures in the future, but how our nation’s past has 
shaped the trajectory of what is feasible in terms of changes that might occur.  
From my own perspective, I do hope that as our Symposium explores 
these broader topics, we keep in mind the particular question of whether the 
system for electing the President produces alignment or misalignment. This 
question deserves particular attention because, as I have indicated, the 
consequences of misalignment in this domain are so especially profound. 
When we ask whether America’s eligible voters are getting the electoral 
results that they want, there is no more pressing question than whether the 
occupant of the Oval Office is the person the American electorate most wanted 
to put there.  
                                                                                                                     
 29 See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 283 (2014).  
